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COMMENT
THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS vs.
THE CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS IN
THE NEW MEXICO CHILDREN'S CODE
Section 13-14-28B3 of the New Mexico statutes, as amended by
the 31st Legislature2 removing certain confidentiality provisions in
the Children's Code, achieves a compromise between those factions
advocating constitutional 3 guarantees of freedom of the press and
those proponents of the concept of a complete separation of child
and adult proceedings. The free press advocates argue for the deterrent and retributive effect of the publication of the names of child
offenders, while those defending the necessity of the confidentiality
provisions argue rehabilitation. As originally enacted in 1972, the
Children's Code contained several provisions requiring the privacy
and confidentiality of hearings and records.4 A look into the backgrounds of the opposing factions followed by an inspection of the
new amendments will be the motif of this comment.
The controversy arising from attempts to establish separate procedural safeguards and criminal sanctions for children is an old one.
The early practices of applying adult procedures and penalties to
children, the imposition of long prison sentences with hardened adult
criminals, and execution for capital offenses were appalling to early
reformers.' The initial trend in establishing a separate juvenile court
1. Except in hearings to declare a person in contempt of court and hearings on petitions
alleging delinquency of a child previously adjudicated a delinquent child, the general public
shall be excluded from hearings on petitions under the Children's Code. Only the parties,
their counsel, witnesses and other persons requested by a party and approved by the court
may be present at a closed hearing. Those other persons the court finds to have a proper
interest in the case or in the work of the court, including members of the bar, may be
admitted by the court to closed hearings on the condition that they refrain from divulging
any information which would identify the child or family involved in the proceedings.
Accredited representatives of the news media shall be allowed to be present at closed
hearings subject to the conditions that they refrain from divulging information that would
identify any child involved in the proceedings or the parents or guardians of those children,
and subject to such enabling regulations as the court finds necessary for the maintenance of
order, decorum and for the furtherance of the purposes of the Children's Code.
2. Laws of New Mexico, chap. 97, § 28 (1972).
3. U.S. Const. amend. I; N.M. Const. art. II, § 17.
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-25D (Supp. 1972), Basic Rights; N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-14-29A, B (Supp. 1972), Conduct of Hearings; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-41A, B, C
(Supp. 1972), Law Enforcement Records; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-42A (Supp. 1972),
Inspection of Social and Legal Records.
5. Horowitz & Nickerson, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: A Retreat in Juvenile Justice, 38
Brooklyn L. Rev. 650 (1972).
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could be seen early in the nineteenth century in New York City and
the state of Massachusetts. 6 The underlying idea, which can be traced
throughout the development of the juvenile court system, was an
attempt to maintain the non-criminal character of juvenile court proceedings through the concept of separateness. The idea of reform and
rehabilitation, rather than punishment, was meant
to get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt with as a
criminal; to save it from the brand of criminality, a brand that sticks
to it for life; to take it in hand and instead of first stigmatizing and
then reforming it, to protect it from the stigma. . ...
Since the passage of the first juvenile court act in Illinois in 1899,8
there has been a development in statutory law toward establishing
separate proceedings in the rest of the states. New Mexico's juvenile
court system was established in 1955," however as early as 1917, the
New Mexico legislature had provided that each county district court
be given jurisdiction over juvenile delinquents, and separate procedures were established for records and disposition of cases.'"
Apparently the early reformers of the court system believed that the
social sciences had progressed to such a degree that rehabilitation of
wayward youth by proper therapy was almost a certainty. This was
an overly optimistic view. The founders of the juvenile court further
assumed that the necessary resources for rehabilitation would be
provided. This did not materialize or turned out to be illusory. In
recent years the number of critics of the juvenile court has grown. It
became obvious that what was to be a court of protection had
turned into a court of oppression. Serious abuses were being inflicted on children. An adjudication of delinquency in the juvenile
court could result in the child losing his freedom in a very real sense.
The institutions available for committing delinquent children were
facilities of punishment-not rehabilitation.'
As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court broke a half-century of silence in
a series of recent cases that established the due process rights of
juveniles which served as guidelines for the current Uniform Juvenile
6. In New York City, a house of refuge was established in 1825 followed by a
asylum. In Massachusetts, children were placed on unofficial probation in adult juvenile
courts.
Parker, Some HistoricalObservations on the Juvenile Court, 9 Crim. L. Q. 467,479 (1967).
7. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104 (1909).

8. 1M. Laws p. 131, § § 1-26 (1899).
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-18-19 (Supp. 1973).
10. Laws of New Mexico, chap. 4, § § 2, 3, and 9 (1917).
11. Specea and White, Variationsand Trends in Proposed Legislationon Juvenile Courts,

40 U. Mo. at K.C. L. Rev. 129, 131 (Winter 1971-72).
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Court Act,' 2 which was adopted by the 1972 Session of the New
Mexico Legislature,' ' and amended by the 1973 Session.' 4
Haley v. Ohio' I first brought the Court's attention to juvenile due
process rights in a matter not directly related to the juvenile court
system concerning a coerced confession.'6 In Kent v. United
States,' I the Supreme Court held that a waiver of jurisdiction by a
District of Columbia juvenile court to the criminal court was not in
compliance with the statutory requirements for a full investigation
and a hearing, and that the 16 year old defendant had been denied
due process and fair treatment.' 8 As a result, the Court was primed
for In re Gault,' 9 considered a landmark in the history of juvenile
rights, in which the Court established the "incarceration test" and
required certain due process procedural safeguards for juvenile proceedings.
One year after Gault, the New Mexico Supreme Court in Peyton v.
Nord2" continued this trend and held that a juvenile charged with a
violation of state law is entitled to a trial by jury if the offense is one
which would be triable by a jury if committed by an adult.'
In 1968, these state and federal case law developments led to the
approval and adoption of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The
Act outlines requirements for juvenile adjudicatory proceedings
within the procedural due process safeguards outlined in Gault2 2 and
Peyton v. Nord2 1 and separates the "delinquent child" from the
"child in need of supervision." 4 In addition, there are several provisions regarding the privacy and confidentiality of hearings and
records. 2 1 In keeping with the underlying theme of rehabilitation,
these provisions were included "to prevent the humilitation and
demoralizing effect of publicity or unnecessary disclosure of private
12. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1908).
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-1 to -45 (Supp. 1972).
14. H.B. 433, 31st Leg., 1st Sess. (1973) amending N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 13-14-3,
13-14-4.1 (new material), 13-14-4.2 (new material), 13-14-15, 13-14-16, 13-14-24,
13-14-35, 13-14-45 (new material); H.B. 442, 31st Leg., 1st Sess. (1973) amending
§ § 13-14-28, 13-14-42, and repealing § 13-14-41.
15. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
16. Horowitz & Nickerson, supra note 5.
17. 383 U.S. 541 (1965).
18. Id. at 562.
19. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. 78 N.M. 717 (1968).
21. Id. at 726.
22. See note 19 supra.
23. See note 20 supra.
24. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-31 (Supp. 1972); see also notes 53 and 56 infra.
25. See note 4 supra.
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affairs heavily charged with feelings of anxiety, guilt, and recrimination." 2 6 It is argued that besides not serving any deterrent function,
the publication or broadcast of the names of juveniles involved in
proceedings adversely affects their attempts to be reinstated into the
community by interfering with attempts to obtain employment,
qualify for bonds, qualify for military service, and obtain licenses. 2
Advocates for the code feel that it is much better to leave the decision concerning publication of information from an individual's
records to the judge involved 2 8 rather than to the press, which is
described as lacking necessary legal expertise and responsibility.2 '
The most formidible attack on the confidentiality provisions in
the code has been waged by the press. The arguments have ranged
from an assertion that the code severely hampers the news-gathering
ability and restricts the press' function of "watch dog" of the
courts, 3 0 to the possibility of unconstitutional 3 violations of freedom of the press. 32 That there was any need for statutory change to
insure confidentiality has been seriously questioned. Under pre-code
law, juvenile court records were to be kept in the probation office or
the juvenile attorney's office and were to be public records and open
to inspection. 3 3 The pre-code policy of many newspapers, including
the Albuquerque Journal, was not to publish the names of juveniles
on initial arrests or probationary proceedings prior to reaching court
status.
Two exceptions to the nondisclosure policy were automobile related cases and serious cases, such as arson and murder, where it was
obvious the names were going to be used anyway. 34 The justification
for the former exception was that if a juvenile was old enough to be
licensed and operate an automobile, he was old enough to have his
name published for incidents related to his operation of that automobile. 3" Notwithstanding these exceptions, a juvenile's name was
26. Policy Statement by the New Mexico Council of the National Council
on Crime and
Delinquency.

27. Id.
28.
29.
Crime
30.

1972.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-9 (Supp. 1972).
Interview with David R. Schmidt, State Director of the New Mexico
Council on
and Delinquency, November 28, 1972.
Interview with Robert Brown, Editor of the Albuquerque Journal,
November 17,

31. See note 3 supra.
32. Interview with Howard Graves, The New Mexico Associated Press,
November 18,

1972.

33. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-8-66 (1955).
34. Interview with Robert Brown, supra note 30.
35. Id; note that new amendment N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-45C removes
Code or municipal traffic code violations by a child from the confidentiality Motor Vehicle
provisions of
the Children's Code.
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published in the Albuquerque Journal's Daily Record column only
when the proceedings reached the court stage. 6 The media thus has
in its own discretion exercised the same theory lying behind the
confidentiality provisions in the current code.
The fundamental issue involved with the First Amendment guarantee against restraints on the press is whether the press has an unrestricted right to gather information. Traditionally, those freedoms
allowed the press have been interpreted as coextensive with free
speech. 3 7 As a result, only the publishing or distributing aspects of
the press' freedoms have been effectively protected. 3" In Lovell v.
City of Griffin, Ga.,3" the United States Supreme Court reversed a
judgment from the Court of Appeals of Georgia affirming the conviction of the defendant who was convicted for violation of a city
ordinance prohibiting the distribution of circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind without a permit saying,
the press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.... The
ordinance cannot be saved because it relates to distribution and not
to publication. 'Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom
as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value.' Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733,
24 L.Ed. 877.40
In City of Blue Island v. Kozul, 4 I the court said, "liberty of circulation is essential to freedom of the press."
It seems logical that the right of the press to gather information
should be included as an essential element of the liberty of the press
to publish and distribute, but neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor
the New Mexico Supreme Court has directly confronted the issue.
In Zemel v. Rusk,4 2 the Supreme Court, in denying a passport to
a man who wanted to go to Cuba, "to satisfy (his) curiosity ...and
36. See note 29 supra; here, the reasoning followed was that many f'rst offenders don't
reach the court stage so if an individual was involved in juvenile court proceedings, the
publication of their name wasn't against public policy.
37. Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 838, 843
(May 1971); Robinson v. Coopwood, 292 F, Supp. 926 (1968); United States v. Berrigan,
283 F. Supp. 336 (1968); Wright v. City of Montgomery, Alabama, 282 F. Supp. 291
(1968); United States v. Cooper, 279 F. Supp. 253 (1968); Klahr v. Winterble, 4 Ariz. App.
158, 418 P.2d 404 (1966); State ex rel Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Coleman, 347 Mo. 1239, 152

S.W.2d 640, 648 (1941); 16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 213 (1) (1955).
38. Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 838, 843

(May 1971).
39. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
40. Id. at 452.
41. 379Ill.511,41 N.E.2d 515,518,519 (1942).
42. 381 U.S. 1 (1964).
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to make him a better informed citizen," held that "the right to speak
and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather
information." 4 In two other cases, Estes v. Texas4 4 and Sheppard
v. Maxwell,4 s the Supreme Court addressed the permissible extent of
trial publicity; specifically, the conduct of newsmen in the court
room. Neither involved the right to gather information.4 6
In Schnell v. City of Chicago,4 7 the U.S. Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit, stated that the plaintiff newsmen's class action for a
permanent injunction preventing the Chicago police from interfering
with photographer's constitutional right to gather and report news
and to photograph news events was sufficient to state a claim under
the civil rights statute.4 8 In Associated Press v. KVOS Inc.,4 9 the
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, declared that "when the
Constitution speaks of the freedom of the press, it refers to the
freedom of private and nongovernmental persons or bodies, engaged
in news gathering and dissemination, from interference by governmental agencies." 5 0
Ultimately, the determination of whether a free press' right to
disseminate new information can be extended to an antecedent right
to gather that information must be arrived at through a balancing
test, commonly used for determining first amendment rights. 5' Regarding the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, the importance of the
press', and ultimately the community's, right to publish the names of
juvenile offenders must be balanced against the state's interest in
protecting the privacy of hearings as well as information and records
in children's cases. If the press is to be accorded the freedom to
gather news in this area, it will have to be shown that a child offender's right to anonymity in the present and the future is outweighed
by the public's right to know.
An attitude favoring the confidentiality of juvenile court records
and hearings is reflected by the recent amendments to the Children's
43. Id. at 17.
44. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
45. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
46. In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1964), the Court declared that "the life or
liberty of any individual in this land should not be put in jeopardy because of the actions of
any news media...;" in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 359 (1966), the Court, in
reference to the press' takeover of a court room during a murder trial said, "the court
should have made some effort to control the release of leads, information, and gossip to the
press by police officers, witnesses, and counsel for both sides."
47. 407 F.2d 1082 (1969).

48. Id. at 1086.
49. 80 F.2d 575 (1935).
50. Id. at 581.
51. See note 38 supra at 850, 854.
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Code by the 1973 Session of the New Mexico Legislature."2 The
amendments make two basic distinctions. Proceedings involving a
child in need of supervision 3 are closed to the public with the

exception that
accredited representatives of the news media shall be allowed to be
present at closed hearings subject to the conditions that they refrain
from divulging information that would identify any child involved in
the proceedings or the parents or guardians of those children, and
subject to such enabling regulations as the court finds necessary for
the maintenance of order, decorum and for the furtherance of the
purposes of the Children's Code. 4
The press, however, is still excluded from inspecting social and
legal records involving a child in need of supervision.s
Hearings involving petitions alleging delinquency of a child previously adjudicated a delinquent' 6 are not designated closed hearings' " and may be attended by the press and the general public. The

court records of any child previously adjudicated delinquent and
alleged to be delinquent in current proceedings are now public

records.5 s

Any past misconceptions concerning the inspection and publication of Motor Vehicle Code or municipal traffic code violations by a
child should be clarified by the new section in H.B. 4339 making
52. See note 14 supra.

53. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-3M (Supp. 1972): "child in need of supervision" means a
child who:
(1) being subject to compulsory school attendance is habitually truant from school; or
(2) habitually disobeys the reasonable and lawful demands of his parents, guardian or
custodian and is ungovernable and beyond their control; or

(3) has committed an offense not classified as criminal or one applicable only to chil-

dren; and
(4) in any of the foregoing situations is in need of care or rehabilitation.
54. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-28B (Supp. 1972) as amended by the 1973 Legislature.
55. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-42 (Supp. 1972) as amended by the 1973 Legislature.
56. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-3N, 0 (Supp. 1972) as amended by the 1973 Legislature: a
delinquent child is one who has committed a delinquent act which would be designated as a
crime under the law if committed by an adult, except for offenses under municipal traffic
codes or the Motor Vehicle Code other than the following offenses when committed by a
child who has not reached his fifteenth birthday:
(1) driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs;
(2) failure to stop in the event of an accident causing death, personal injuries or damage
to property;

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

reckless driving;
driving without a valid operator's license or permit;
any offense punishable as a felony; or
any offense not within the trial jurisdiction of magistrate or municipal courts.

57. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-28B (Supp. 1972) as amended by the 1973 Legislature.
58. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-42C (Supp. 1972) as amended by the 1973 Legislature.

59. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-45 (Supp. 1973).
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these violations no longer subject to the confidentiality provisions of
the Children's Code.
These amendments reflect a positive attempt on the part of the
legislature to appease the free press proponents, but the new provisions definitely embody the case law concepts discussed earlier6 0 in
that they are still weighted in favor of the youthful first offender's
right to anonymity.
STEPHEN KNOWLES QUINN

60. See pages 5-8 supra.

